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Abstract
Coset constructions of q-ary Reed-Muller codes can be used to store
secrets on a distributed storage system in such a way that only par-
ties with access to a large part of the system can obtain information
while still allowing for local error-correction. In this paper we deter-
mine the relative generalized Hamming weights of these codes which
can be translated into a detailed description of the information leak-
age [2, 21, 18, 9].
Keywords: Distributed storage, q-ary Reed-Muller code, relative gen-
eralized Hamming weight, secret sharing.
1 Introduction
We consider the situation where a central party wants to store sensitive
information (a secret) on a distributed storage system in such a way that
other parties with access to a large part of the system will be able to recover
it, but other parties will not. The following requirements are natural:
R1: Access to arbitrary r (or more) of the stored data symbols makes it
possible to recover the secret in full, however, with τ (or less) one
cannot recover any information – or less restrictive one can only recover
a limited amount of information.
∗olav@math.aau.dk
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R2: The storage device must be able to locally repair itself. More pre-
cisely, if the storage media experiences random errors then with a very
high probability any stored symbol can be corrected from only a small
number of randomly accessed locations (symbols) of the media.
To meet simultaneously the requirements R1 and R2 we propose to use a
coset construction C1/C2 of q-ary Reed-Muller codes. As is well-known any
linear ramp secret sharing scheme can be realized as a coset construction
of two linear codes and vice versa [4]. By choosing the code C1 to be a
q-ary Reed-Muller code not only do we address R1 but we also meet the
requirement R2. This is due to the fact that q-ary Reed-Muller codes are
locally correctable. When considering the coset construction C1/C2 rather
than C1 this property is always maintained (See Section 2) which corresponds
to R2. The local correctability properties of q-ary Reed-Muller codes have
been studied in detail, see e.g. [15, 26].
Definition 1.1. Let q be a power of a prime, u an integer, s a positive integer,
and write n = qs. We enumerate the elements of (Fq)
s as {P1, . . . , Pn} and
consider the evaluation map ϕ : Fq[X1, . . . , Xs]→ (Fq)
n, ϕ(f) = (f(P1), . . . , f(Pn)).
The q-ary Reed-Muller code of order u in s variables is defined by
RMq(u, s) = {ϕ(f) : f ∈ Fq[X1, . . . , Xs], deg(f) ≤ u}. (1)
Definition 1.2. A code C ⊆ (Fq)
n is said to be (ρ, δ, ε)-correctable if there
exists a randomized error-correcting algorithm A which takes as input ~y ∈
(Fq)
n and i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
1. for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and all vectors ~c ∈ C, ~y ∈ (Fq)
n which differ in at
most δ positions
Pr[A(~y, i) = ci] ≥ 1− ε
where the probability is modelling the random coin tosses of the algo-
rithm A. Here, ci means the i-th entry of ~c.
2. A makes at most ρ queries to ~y.
The following theorem corresponds to [26, Pro. 2.4, Pro. 2.5, Pro. 2.6].
Theorem 1.3. If u < q − 1 then RMq(u, s) is (u + 1, δ, (u + 1)δ)-locally
correctable for all δ. Let σ < 1 be a positive real and assume u ≤ σ(q−1)−1.
Then RMq(u, s) is (q − 1, δ, 2δ/(1 − σ))-locally correctable for all δ and if
furthermore δ < 1/2−σ then it is (q−1, δ, 4(δ−δ2)/[(q−1)(1−2(σ−δ))2])-
locally correctable.
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Turning to the question of information leakage in connection with ramp
secret sharing schemes based on q-ary Reed Muller codes, not much can be
found in the literature (see, however, [6] for other interesting results on se-
cret sharing schemes related to binary Reed-Muller codes). In the present
paper we fill this gap. More precisely we establish the true values of all corre-
sponding relative generalized Hamming weights for q-ary Reed Muller codes
in two variables. For the case of more variables we device a simple and low
complexity algorithm to determine the parameters. By known methods these
results then easily translate into a detailed and accurate description of the
leakage to unauthorized parties as well as the number of symbols needed for
the authorized parties to recover the secret. We note that a similar analysis
has not been made before for any of the known families of locally correctable
codes.
Our work on relative generalized Hamming weights of q-ary Reed-Muller
codes is a non-trivial generalization of results by Heijnen and Pellikaan [12],
who based on the Feng-Rao bound for dual codes, showed how to calculate
generalized Hamming weights of q-ary Reed-Muller codes. Until recently the
relative generalized Hamming weights have been determined. for one family
only, namely the family of MDS-codes. In the recent paper [9] a method was
given to estimate these parameters for one-point algebraic geometric codes
through the use of the Feng-Rao bounds for dual or primary codes. More
results in this direction were presented in [8], [7], [27] and [19], the latter
dealing with more-point algebraic geometric codes. The present paper is a
natural continuation of [12] and [9], however, to keep the description as sim-
ple as possible, in the presentation of the present paper we use the footprint
bound from Gröbner basis theory rather than the Feng-Rao bounds.
The paper is organized as follows. We start in Section 2 by giving some
background information on ramp secret sharing schemes and in particular
we explain the role of a coset construction of q-ary Reed-Muller codes. The
subsequent four sections treat our main task which is determination of the rel-
ative generalized Hamming weights of q-ary Reed-Muller codes. In Section 3
we present the theory, based on which we shall derive the weights. Section 4
shows a general method to derive any of the weights, and this method is for-
malized into a simple and low complexity algorithm in Section 5. Finally in
Section 6 we present closed formula expressions for q-ary Reed-Muller codes
in two variables. In Section 7 we revert to the communication problem of se-
cret sharing on a distributed storage system. We make some general remarks
on the connection between information leakage and local correctability and
we give a number of examples. Section 8 is the conclusion.
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2 Linear ramp secret sharing schemes
A ramp secret sharing scheme is a cryptographic method to encode a secret
~s into multiple shares c1, . . . , cn so that only from specified subsets of the
shares one can recover ~s. The encoding is in general probabilistic, meaning
that to each secret ~s there corresponds a collection of possible share vectors
~c = (c1, . . . , cn). Special attention has been given to linear ramp secret shar-
ing schemes [4]. Here, the space of secrets is (Fq)
ℓ, where ℓ ≥ 1 is some fixed
integer, and c1, . . . , cn ∈ Fq. Moreover, if ~c1 is an encoding of ~s1 and ~c2 is an
encoding of ~s2, then also ~c1 + ~c2 is an encoding of ~s1 + ~s2.
A linear ramp secret sharing scheme with n participants, secrets in (Fq)
ℓ,
and shares belonging to Fq can be described as follows [4]. Consider linear
codes C2 ( C1 ⊂ (Fq)
n with ℓ = dim(C1) − dim(C2) and let L ⊆ (Fq)
n be
(a linear code) such that C1 = L⊕ C2, where ⊕ is the direct sum. Consider
a vector space isomorphism ψ : (Fq)
ℓ → L. A secret ~s ∈ (Fq)
ℓ is mapped to
~x = ψ(~s) + ~c2 ∈ C1, where ~c2 ∈ C2 is chosen by random. For the analysis,
we assume that also the secrets are chosen uniformly from (Fq)
ℓ. In this
way, the vectors of shares are chosen uniformly from C1. The n shares dis-
tributed among the n participants are the n coordinates of ~x. The threshold
parameters t and r of the scheme are the unique numbers such that:
1. No group of t participants can recover any information about ~s, but
some groups of size t + 1 can.
2. All groups of size r can recover the secret in full, but some groups of
size r − 1 cannot.
Only for ℓ = 1 we can hope for r = t + 1 in which case we have a complete
picture of the security. Such schemes are called t-threshold secret sharing
schemes. For general linear ramp secret sharing schemes we have the param-
eters t1, . . . , tℓ, r1, . . . , rℓ where for m = 1, . . . , ℓ, tm and rm are the unique
numbers such that the following hold:
1. No group of tm participants can recover m q-bits of information about
~s, but some groups of size tm + 1 can.
2. All groups of size rm can recover m q-bits of information about ~s, but
some groups of size rm − 1 cannot.
Clearly, t = t1 and r = rℓ. Observe that the τ in requirement R1 could either
be t or it could be ti for some low value of i. From [2, Th. 6.7], [18, Th. 4]
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and [9, Th. 6] we have the following characterization of these parameters:
tm = Mm((C2)
⊥, (C1)
⊥)− 1 (2)
rm = n−Mℓ−m+1(C1, C2) + 1, (3)
where Mm(C1, C2) is the m-th relative generalized Hamming weight for C1
with respect to C2 and (C)
⊥ denotes the dual code of C. To make the
section complete we need a formal definition of these parameters. We start by
recalling the well-know concept of generalized Hamming weights [16, 13, 24].
Recall that for D ⊆ (Fq)
n the support of D is defined as
supp(D) = {i : ci 6= 0 for some ~c = (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ D}.
Definition 2.1. Let C be a linear code and k its dimension. For r = 1, . . . , k,
the r-th generalized Hamming weight (GHW) of C is defined by
dr(C) = min{|supp(D)| : D is a linear subcode of C and dim(D) = r}.
The sequence (d1(C), . . . , dk(C)) is called the hierarchy of the GHWs of C.
Note that in particular d1(C) is the minimum distance of C. A further
generalization of GHWs was introduced by Luo et al. in [21].
Definition 2.2. Let C2 ( C1 be linear codes, ℓ = dim(C1) − dim(C2) the
codimension of C1 and C2, and n the length of the codes. For m = 1, . . . , ℓ,
the m-th relative generalized Hamming weight (RGHW) of C1 with respect
to C2 is defined by
Mm(C1, C2) = min
J⊆{1,...,n}
{|J | : dim((C1)J)− dim((C2)J) = m}
where (Ci)J = {~c ∈ Ci : ct = 0 for t /∈ J} for i = 1, 2. The sequence
(M1(C1, C2), . . . , Mℓ(C1, C2)) is called the hierarchy of the RGHWs of C1
with respect to C2.
If C2 is the zero code {~0} then the m-th RGHW of C1 with respect to C2
is equivalent to the m-th GHW of C1. This fact should be more clear from
the following result [20, Lem. 1].
Theorem 2.3. Let C2 ( C1 be linear codes and ℓ = dim(C1) − dim(C2) be
the codimension of C1 and C2. For m = 1, . . . , ℓ we have that
Mm(C1, C2) = min{|supp(D)| : D is a linear subcode of C1,
D ∩ C2 = {~0} and dim(D) = m}.
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This alternative characterization of RGHWs is useful when the codes are
of an algebraic nature.
Remark 1. It is well-known that RMq(u, s)
⊥ = RMq((q − 1)m− u− 1, s),
[12, Rem. 4.7]. Hence, when both C1 and C2 are q-ary Reed-Muller codes
then the information leakage described in (2) and (3) is all about relative
generalized Hamming weights of q-ary Reed-Muller codes.
Remark 2. As described in this section, in a ramp secret sharing scheme
C1/C2, the code C1 is divided into disjoint subsets each corresponding to a
given message. The security comes from the randomness with which one picks
the element of the subset. This randomness does not reduce (nor increase)
the locally error-correcting ability of C1 as the encoded message is still a word
in C1. Hence, if C1 is a q-ary Reed-Muller code then Theorem 1.3 describes
the ability to perform local error-correction in C1/C2.
We finally remark that the situation of secret sharing is more or less simi-
lar to that of communication over a wire-tap channel of type II [25], however
we shall not pursue this connection any further in the present paper.
In the following four sections we shall concentrate on estimating the
RGHWs of q-ary Reed-Muller codes which as noted gives an overview on
the information leakage from the corresponding schemes C1/C2.
3 Useful tools to establish the RGHWs
We start our investigations by presenting in this section some theory that
shall help us to derive the weights. The section also includes some initial
results in this direction. First we elaborate slightly on the definition of q-ary
Reed-Muller codes.
Definition 3.1. Let q be a power of a prime, u an integer, s a positive integer,
and write n = qs. We enumerate the elements of (Fq)
s as {P1, . . . , Pn} and
consider the evaluation map ϕ : Fq[X1, . . . , Xs]→ (Fq)
n, ϕ(f) = (f(P1), . . . , f(Pn)).
The q-ary Reed-Muller code of order u in s variables is defined by
RMq(u, s) = {ϕ(f) : f ∈ Fq[X1, . . . , Xs], deg(f) ≤ u}
= spanFq{ϕ(X
a1
1 · · ·X
as
s ) : 0 ≤ a1, . . . , as < q, a1 + · · ·+ as ≤ u}. (4)
In this paper we shall use the convention deg(0) = −1 and spanFq{} = {
~0}.
Hence RMq(−1, s) = {~0}.
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Throughout the rest of the paper we shall always write n = qs. Observe
that the equality in (4) is a consequence of the fact that
ϕ(f) = ϕ(f rem {Xq1 −X1, . . . , X
q
s −Xs}) (5)
for any f ∈ Fq[X1, . . . , Xs]. Here, the argument on the right side of (5)
means the remainder of f after division with {Xq1−X1, . . . , X
q
s −Xs} (see [5,
Sec. 2.3] for the multivariate division algorithm). Furthermore note that ϕ
is surjective which is seen by applying Lagrange interpolation. Dimension
considerations now show that the restriction of ϕ to the span of
Rsq = {X
a1
1 · · ·X
as
s : 0 ≤ ai < q, i = 1, . . . , s}
is a bijection and {ϕ(M) : M ∈ Rsq} therefore is a basis for (Fq)
n as a vector
space. We write
Qsq = {(a1, . . . , as) ∈ N
s
0 : 0 ≤ ai < q, i = 1, . . . , s}
and ~X~a = Xa11 · · ·X
as
s for ~a = (a1, . . . , as) ∈ N
s
0. Hence, R
s
q = { ~X
~a : ~a ∈ Qsq}.
Remark 3. From the above discussion we conclude that if D ⊆ RMq(u, s)
is a subspace of dimension m then without loss of generality we may as-
sume that D = spanFq{ϕ(F1), . . . , ϕ(Fm)} where the leading monomials
(with respect to the given fixed monomial ordering ≺) satisfy lm(Fi) ∈ R
s
q,
lm(Fi) 6= lm(Fj) for i 6= j, and deg(Fi) ≤ u for i = 1, . . .m. For given D and
fixed ≺ these leading monomials are unique.
We could calculate the RGHWs of q-ary Reed-Muller codes using the
technique from [9] where the Feng-Rao bound for primary codes is employed.
However, the simple algebraic structure of the q-ary Reed-Muller codes sug-
gests that instead we should apply the footprint bound which we now intro-
duce.
Definition 3.2. Let k be a field and consider an ideal J ⊆ k[X1, . . . , Xs]
and a fixed monomial ordering ≺. Let M(X1, . . . , Xs) denote the set of
monomials in the variables X1, . . . , Xs. The footprint of J with respect to ≺
is the set
∆≺(J) = {M ∈M(X1, . . . , Xs) : M is not leading monomial of any polynomial in J}.
Example 1. We see immediately that ∆≺(〈X
q
1 −X1, . . . , X
q
s −Xs〉) ⊆ R
s
q.
From [5, Th. 6] we have the following well-known result.
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Theorem 3.3. Let the notation be as in Definition 3.2. The set {M + J :
M ∈ ∆≺(J)} is a basis for k[X1, . . . , Xs]/J as a vector space over k.
Example 2. This is a continuation of Example 1. From Theorem 3.3 and the
fact th at ϕ : Rsq → (Fq)
n is a bijection we conclude ∆≺(〈X
q
1 −X1, . . . , X
q
s −
Xs〉) = R
s
q.
Consider polynomials F1, . . . , Fm ∈ Fq[X1, . . . , Xs]. Let {Q1, . . . , QN}
be their common zeros over Fq and define the vector space homomorphism
ψ : Fq[X1, . . . , Xs] → (Fq)
N , ψ(f) = (f(Q1), . . . , f(Qs)). This map is sur-
jective (Lagrange interpolation again) and by Theorem 3.3 the domain of
ψ is a vector space of dimension |∆≺(〈F1, . . . , Fm, X
q
1 −X1, . . . , X
q
s −Xs〉)|
(independently of the chosen monomial ordering ≺). As a corollary to The-
orem 3.3 we therefore obtain the following incidence of the footprint bound.
For the general version of the footprint bound see [14] and [5, Pro. 8, Sec.
5.3].
Lemma 3.4. Let F1, . . . , Fm ∈ Fq[X1, . . . , Xs]. The number of common zeros
of F1, . . . , Fm over Fq is at most equal to |∆≺(〈F1, . . . , Fm, X
q
1 −X1, . . . , X
q
s −Xs〉)|
(here, ≺ is any monomial ordering).
We note that actually equality holds in Lemma 3.4 (see [5, Pro. 8, Sec.
5.3]), but we shall not need this fact. To make Lemma 3.4 operational we
recall the following notation from [3].
Definition 3.5. The partial ordering P on the monomials in R
s
q and on
the elements in Qsq is defined by
~X~aP ~X
~b (or ~aP~b) ⇐⇒ ai ≤ bi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , s}.
The upward shadow of ~a ∈ Qsq is ∇~a = {
~b ∈ Qsq :
~bP~a}.
The lower shadow of ~a ∈ Qsq is ∆~a = {
~b ∈ Qsq :
~bP~a}.
Let A ⊆ Qsq, we define ∇A =
⋃
~a∈A∇~a and ∆A =
⋃
~a∈A ∆~a.
Example 3. For ~a = (2, 3) ∈ Q24 we have that
∇~a = {(2, 3), (3, 3)}
∆~a = {(2, 3), (1, 3), (0, 3), (2, 2), (1, 2), (0, 2), (2, 1), (1, 1), (0, 1), (2, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0)}.
The partial ordering is not a total ordering; for example we neither have
(3, 2)P(2, 3) nor (3, 2)P(2, 3).
An important tool for calculating RGHWs of q-ary Reed-Muller codes is
the following corollary to Lemma 3.4.
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Corollary 1. Consider any monomial ordering and let D = spanFq{ϕ(F1), . . . , ϕ(Fm)}
be a subspace of (Fq)
n of dimension m where without loss of generality we as-
sume lm(Fi) = ~X
~ai ∈ Rsq for i = 1, . . . , m and ~ai 6= ~aj for i 6= j (Remark 3).
Writing A = {~a1, . . . ,~am} we have |supp(D)| ≥ |∇A| .
Proof. The elements of D are linear combination of ϕ(F1), . . . , ϕ(Fm), hence
|supp(D)| equals the length nminus the number of common zeros of F1, . . . , Fm
over Fq. By Lemma 3.4 we get
|supp(D)|
≥ n− |∆≺(〈F1, . . . , Fm, X
q
1 −X1, . . . , X
q
s −Xs〉)|
≥ n−
∣∣∣∣
(
∆≺(〈X
q
1 −X1, . . . , X
q
s −Xs〉)
\ ∪mi=1 { ~X
~a ∈ ∆≺(〈X
q
1 −X1, . . . , X
q
s −Xs〉) : ~X
~a is divisible by ~X~ai}
)∣∣∣∣
= n− |Rsq|+ |
m⋃
i=1
{~a ∈ Qsq : ~aP~ai}| = |
m⋃
i=1
∇~ai| = |∇A|
and the proof is complete.
Interestingly for any choice of A as in Corollary 1 there exists some sub-
spaces D for which the bound is sharp.
Proposition 1. Consider any monomial ordering and A = {~a1, . . . ,~am} ⊆
Qsq where ~ai 6= ~aj for i 6= j. Then
min{|supp(D)| : D = spanFq{ϕ(F1), . . . , ϕ(Fm)} for some F1, . . . , Fm
with lm(Fi) = ~X
~ai , i = 1, . . . , m} = |∇A|.
Proof. From Corollary 1 we know that
min{|supp(D)| : D = spanFq{ϕ(F1), . . . , ϕ(Fm)} for some F1, . . . , Fm
with lm(Fi) = ~X
~ai , i = 1, . . . , m} ≥ |∇A|.
Now we want to prove the other inequality. Let Fq = {γ0, . . . , γq−1} and
~a = (a1, . . . , as) ∈ Q
s
q, we write ~γ~a = (γa1 , . . . , γas). For i = 1, . . . , m, we
write the coordinates of ~ai as (ai,1, ai,2, . . . , ai,s). We define the following
subspace of (Fq)
n:
D˜ = spanFq {ϕ(G1), . . . , ϕ(Gm)} with Gi =
s∏
t=1
ai,t−1∏
j=0
(Xt−γj) for i = 1, . . . , m.
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For i = 1, . . . , m we have lm(Gi) = ~X
~ai . Furthermore Gi(γ~a) 6= 0 if and only
if ~a ∈ Qsq satisfies ~aiP~a. The last result is equivalent to saying that Gi(γ~a) 6=
0 if and only if ~a ∈ ∇~ai. The support of D˜ is the union of all positions where
some ϕ(Gi) does not equal 0. Hence, |supp(D˜)| = |
⋃m
i=1∇~ai| = |∇A|. The
proof is complete.
Recall that a q-ary Reed-Muller code is defined as
RMq(u, s) = spanFq{ϕ(f) : f ∈ R
s
q, deg(f) ≤ u}.
As is well-known [12] the minimum distance strictly increases when u in-
creases (until the code equals (Fq)
n). Hence, if we consider two codes C1 =
RMq(u1, s), C2 = RMq(u2, s) with u2 < u1 then
M1(C1, C2) = d (6)
where d is the minimum distance of C1. From Proposition 1 it is not difficult
to establish the other extreme case, namely that of Mℓ(C1, C2) where ℓ =
dimC1 − dimC2. We have Mℓ(C1, C2) = |∇A| where
A = {(a1, . . . , as) : 0 ≤ ai < q, i = 1, . . . , s, u2 <
s∑
i=1
a1 ≤ u1}.
We have |Qsq\∇A| = dimC2 and therefore
Mℓ(C1, C2) = n− dimC2. (7)
Treating the intermediate cases is much more subtle. This is done in the
following sections.
4 RGHWs of q-ary Reed-Muller codes
In this section we employ Proposition 1 to compute the hierarchy of RGHWs
in the case that C1 and C2 are both q-ary Reed-Muller codes. The main
result is Theorem 4.8.
Our method for calculating the hierarchy of RGHWs involves the anti
lexicographic ordering on the monomials in Rsq (and on the elements in Q
s
q).
To relate our findings to Heijnen and Pellikaan’s work on GHWs we also need
the lexicographic ordering on the same sets.
Definition 4.1. The lexicographic ordering ≺Lex on the monomials in R
s
q
and on the elements in Qsq is defined by
~X~a≺Lex ~X
~b(or ~a≺Lex~b) ⇐⇒ a1 = b1, . . . , al−1 = bl−1 and al < bl for some l.
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The anti lexicographic ordering ≺A on the monomials in R
s
q and on the
elements in Qsq is defined by
~X~a≺A ~X
~b(or ~a≺A~b) ⇐⇒ as = bs, . . . , as−l+1 = bs−l+1 and as−l > bs−l for some l.
Example 4. For s = 2, q = 3 with X = X1 and Y = X2 we have
1≺LexY≺LexY
2≺LexX≺LexXY≺LexXY
2≺LexX
2≺LexX
2Y≺LexX
2Y 2,
X2Y 2≺AXY
2≺AY
2≺AX
2Y≺AXY≺AY≺AX
2≺AX≺A1.
From this example it is easy to see that the anti lexicographic ordering is
not the inverse ordering of the lexicographic ordering. Recalling from Defini-
tion 3.5 the ordering P we note that if ~X
~aP ~X
~b (or ~aP~b) then ~X
~aLex ~X
~b
and ~X~aA ~X
~b (or ~aLex~b and ~aA~b).
The following concepts will be used extensively throughout our exposi-
tion.
Definition 4.2. Given ~a = (a1, . . . , as) ∈ Q
s
q, we call deg(~a) = deg(
~X~a) =∑s
t=1 at the degree of ~a. Let a, b be two integers with 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ s(q − 1),
then we define
Fq((a, b), s) = {~a ∈ Q
s
q : a ≤ deg(~a) ≤ b} and
Wq((a, b), s) = { ~X
~a ∈ Rsq : ~a ∈ Fq((a, b), s)}.
The index q and the value s will be omitted in the rest of this section,
thus instead we will use the notations F (a, b) and W (a, b), respectively.
Definition 4.3. Let m ∈ {1, . . . , |F (a, b)|}, we denote by L(a,b)(m) the set
of the first m elements of F (a, b) using the lexicographic ordering and by
N(a,b)(m) the set of the firstm elements of F (a, b) using the anti lexicographic
ordering.
The sets N(a,b)(m) will play a crucial role in the following derivation of
a formula for the RGHWs of q-ary Reed-Muller codes. The sets L(a,b)(m)
shall help us establish the connection to the work by Heijnen and Pellikaan
on GHWs. Their main result [12, Th. 5.10] is as follows:
Theorem 4.4. Let ~a = (a1, . . . , as) be the r-th element in F (s(q − 1) −
u1, s(q − 1)) with respect to the lexicographic ordering. Then
dr(RMq(u1, s)) = |∆L(s(q−1)−u1,s(q−1))(r)| =
s∑
i=1
as−i+1q
i−1 + 1. (8)
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Before continuing our work on establishing the RGHWs we reformulate
the expressions in (8). We shall need the following result corresponding to
[12, Lem. 5.8].
Lemma 4.5. Let t be an integer satisfying 1 ≤ t ≤ qs. Write t − 1 =∑s
i=1 as−i+1q
i−1. Then (a1, . . . , as) is the t-th element of Q
s
q with respect to
the lexicographic ordering.
Also we shall need the bijection µ : Qsq → Q
s
q given by µ(a1, . . . , as) =
(q − 1− as, . . . , q − 1− a1). Observe that µ has the properties
• ~a≺A~b ⇐⇒ µ(~a)≺Lexµ(~b),
• µ(F (a, b)) = F (s(q − 1)− b, s(q − 1)− a),
• µ(∇N(a,b)(m)) = ∆L(s(q−1)−b,s(q−1)−a)(m).
For the proofs and other properties of µ we refer to Lemma A.1 in Ap-
pendix A. Note that by the first property an element ~a in a subset A of Qsq
is the t-th element in A using the anti lexicographic ordering if and only if
µ(~a) is the t-th element in µ(A) using the lexicographic ordering. We can
now reformulate Theorem 4.4 into the following result which is not stated in
[12].
Theorem 4.6. Let ~a be the r-th element in F (0, u1) using the anti lexico-
graphic ordering. Because F (0, u1) ⊆ Q
s
q there exists t such that ~a is the t-th
element in Qsq using the anti lexicographic ordering. We have
dr(RMq(u1, s)) = |∇N(0,u1)(r)| = t.
Proof. By the properties of µ and using the lexicographic ordering, we have
that µ(~a) = (a˜1, . . . , a˜s) is the r-th element in F (s(q− 1)− u1, s(q− 1)) and
the t-th element in Qsq. From Theorem 4.4 we get
dr(RMq(u1, s)) = |∆L(s(q−1)−u1,s(q−1))(r)| =
s∑
i=1
a˜s−i+1q
i−1 + 1
where by Lemma 4.5 the last expression can be rewritten as
∑s
i=1 a˜s−i+1q
i−1+
1 = t− 1 + 1 = t.
From the third listed property of µ we obtain
|∇N(0,u1)(r)| = |µ(∇N(0,u1)(r))| = |∆L(s(q−1)−u1,s(q−1))(r)|.
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Having reformulated the formula by Heijnen and Pellikaan for GHWs we
now continue our work on establishing a formula for the RGHWs. Consider
C2 = RMq(u2, s) ( C1 = RMq(u1, s). Let ℓ be the codimension of C1 and
C2, then for m = 1, . . . , ℓ we have that
Mm(C1, C2) = min{|supp(D)| : D is a linear subcode of C1,
D ∩ C2 = {~0} and dim(D) = m} (9)
= min{|supp(D)| : D = spanFq{ϕ(F1), . . . , ϕ(Fm)},
lm(F1) = ~X
~a1 , . . . , lm(Fm) = ~X
~am , ~ai 6= ~aj for i 6= j
and ~X~ai ∈ W (u2 + 1, u1) for i = 1, . . . , m} (10)
Equation (9) corresponds to Theorem 2.3. Equation (10) follows from Re-
mark 3 and the fact that D ⊆ C1 implies lm(Fi) ∈ W (0, u1), i = 1, . . . , m
and from the fact that D∩C2 = {~0} implies lm(Fi) /∈ W (0, u2), i = 1, . . . , m.
In conclusion lm(Fi) ∈ W (u2 + 1, u1), i = 1, . . . , m. Combining (10) with
Proposition 1 we get
Mm(C1, C2) = min{|
m⋃
i=1
∇~ai| : ~ai ∈ F (u2 + 1, u1), i = 1, . . .m
and ~ai 6= ~aj , for i 6= j}
= min{|∇A| : A ⊆ F (u2 + 1, u1), |A| = m}. (11)
The following lemma – which can be viewed as a generalization of [11, Th.
3.7.7] – is proved in Appendix A.
Lemma 4.7. Let A be a subset of F (a, b) consisting of m elements. Then
|∇N(a,b)(m)| ≤ |∇A|.
Proposition 2. Let C2 = RMq(u2, s) ( C1 = RMq(u1, s). We have
Mm(C1, C2) = |∇N(u2+1,u1)(m)|
Proof. Follows from (11) and Lemma 4.7.
We are now ready to present the generalization of Theorem 4.6 to RGHWs.
Theorem 4.8. Given C2 = RMq(u2, s) ( C1 = RMq(u1, s), let ~a be the
m-th element in F (u2 +1, u1) with respect to the anti lexicographic ordering.
Because F (u2 + 1, u1) ⊆ F (0, u1) ⊆ Q
s
q there exist r and t such that ~a is the
r-th element in F (0, u1) and the t-th element in Q
s
q with respect to the anti
lexicographic ordering. We have
Mm(C1, C2) = t− r +m.
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Proof. By Proposition 2 we have already proved thatMm(C1, C2) = |∇N(u2+1,u1)(m)|.
It remains to be proved that |∇N(u2+1,u1)(m)| = t− r +m. Because ~a is the
m-th element in F (u2 + 1, u1) and the r-th element in F (0, u1) we have
N(0,u1)(r) = N(0,u2)(r −m) ∪N(u2+1,u1)(m)
from which we derive
∇N(0,u1)(r) = ∇N(u2+1,u1)(m) ∪ ∇N(0,u2)(r −m)
= ∇N(u2+1,u1)(m) ∪ (∇N(0,u2)(r −m)\∇N(u2+1,u1)(m)).(12)
The union in (12) involves two disjoint sets. Hence,
|∇N(u2+1,u1)(m)| = |∇N(0,u1)(r)| − |∇N(0,u2)(r −m)\∇N(u2+1,u1)(m)|.
From Theorem 4.6 we have |∇N(0,u1)(r)| = t. Hence, we will be through if
we can prove that
|∇N(0,u2)(r −m)\∇N(u2+1,u1)(m)| = r −m. (13)
We enumerate N(0,u2)(r −m) = {~a1, . . . ,~ar−m} according to the anti lexico-
graphic ordering. We have
∇N(0,u2)(r −m)\∇N(u2+1,u1)(m) =
(
∇
r−m⋃
i=1
{~ai}
)
\∇N(u2+1,u1)(m)
=
(
r−m⋃
i=1
∇~ai
)
\∇N(u2+1,u1)(m) =
(
r−m⋃
i=1
∇~ai\∇{~at : t < i}
)
\∇N(u2+1,u1)(m)
=
r−m⋃
i=1
(
∇~ai\
(
∇{~at : t < i} ∪ ∇N(u2+1,u1)(m)
))
. (14)
We will prove that
∇~ai\
(
∇{~at : t < i} ∪ ∇N(u2+1,u1)(m)
)
= {~ai} (15)
holds for i = 1, . . . , r −m.
As ~ai≻A~at for t < i, we have ~ai /∈ ∇{~at : t < i}. Furthermore from
deg(~ai) ≤ u2 and deg(~c) ≥ u2 + 1 for any ~c ∈ ∇N(u2+1,u1)(m), we conclude
~ai /∈ ∇N(u2+1,u1)(m). It follows that
{~ai} ⊆ ∇~ai\
(
∇{~at : t < i} ∪ ∇N(u2+1,u1)(m)
)
.
Now we prove the other inclusion. Assume first ~ai ∈ F (u2, u2). For t =
1, . . . , s we define ~bt = ~ai + ~et where ~et is the standard vector with 1 in the
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t-th position. If ~bt ∈ Q
s
q then
~bt ∈ N(u2+1,u1)(m) because deg(~bt) = u2+1 and
~a≻A~ai≻A~bt. It follows that
∇~ai\
(
∇{~at : t < i} ∪ ∇N(u2+1,u1)(m)
)
⊆ ∇~ai\∇({~b1, . . . ,~bs} ∩Q
s
q) = {~ai}.
Assume next ~ai /∈ F (u2, u2). Again we define ~bt = ~ai + ~et for t = 1, . . . , s. If
~bt ∈ Q
s
q then
~bt ∈ {~at : t < i} because deg(~bt) ≤ u2 and ~ai≻A~bt. Hence,
∇~ai\
(
∇{~at : t < i} ∪ ∇N(u2+1,u1)(m)
)
⊆ ∇~ai\∇({~b1, . . . ,~bs} ∩Q
s
q) = {~ai}.
We have established (15).
Combining finally (15) and (14) we obtain
∇N(0,u2)(r −m)\∇N(u2+1,u1)(m) =
r−m⋃
i=1
{~ai} = N(0,u2)(r −m).
By Definition 4.3 the last set is of size r −m and (13) follows. The proof is
complete.
Consider the special case of Theorem 4.8 where C2 = {~0} = RMq(−1, s).
In this particular case we have – as already noted – dm(C1) = Mm(C1, C2).
If we apply Theorem 4.8 and the notion in there then we obtain r = m and
consequently Mm(C1, C2) = t. Theorem 4.6 gives us the same information
dm(C1) = t.
We illustrate the use of Theorem 4.6 and Theorem 4.8 with an example.
Example 5. In this example we consider Reed-Muller codes in two variables
over F5. We first consider the case C1 = RM5(5, 2) and C2 = RM5(3, 2). Fig-
ure 1 illustrates how to find r and m for any given t and how to calculate
dr(C1) and Mm(C1, C2) from this information. The elements of Q
2
5 are de-
picted in Part 1.1. In Parts 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 we illustrate how the elements
of Q25, F (0, 5) and F (4, 5), respectively, are ordered. Finally, Part 1.5 il-
lustrates how to determine dr(C1) and Mm(C1, C2) from Theorem 4.6 and
Theorem 4.8, respectively.
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(0, 4) (1, 4) (2, 4) (3, 4) (4, 4)
(0, 3) (1, 3) (2, 3) (3, 3) (4, 3)
(0, 2) (1, 2) (2, 2) (3, 2) (4, 2)
(0, 1) (1, 1) (2, 1) (3, 1) (4, 1)
(0, 0) (1, 0) (2, 0) (3, 0) (4, 0)
Part 1.1 : Q2
5
5 4 3 2 1
10 9 8 7 6
15 14 13 12 11
20 19 18 17 16
25 24 23 22 21
Part 1.2: t-th
positions in Q2
5
2 1
5 4 3
9 8 7 6
14 13 12 11 10
19 18 17 16 15
Part 1.3: r-th
positions in F (0, 5)
2 1
4 3
6 5
8 7
9
Part 1.4: m-th
positions in F (4, 5)
Q2
5
t r m dr(C1) Mm(C1, C2)
= t = t − r + m
(4, 4) 1 - - - -
(3, 4) 2 - - - -
(2, 4) 3 - - - -
(1, 4) 4 1 1 4 4
(0, 4) 5 2 2 5 5
(4, 3) 6 - - - -
(3, 3) 7 - - - -
(2, 3) 8 3 3 8 8
(1, 3) 9 4 4 9 9
(0, 3) 10 5 - 10 -
(4, 2) 11 - - - -
(3, 2) 12 6 5 12 11
(2, 2) 13 7 6 13 12
(1, 2) 14 8 - 14 -
(0, 2) 15 9 - 15 -
(4, 1) 16 10 7 16 13
(3, 1) 17 11 8 17 14
(2, 1) 18 12 - 18 -
(1, 1) 19 13 - 19 -
(0, 1) 20 14 - 20 -
(4, 0) 21 15 9 21 15
(3, 0) 22 16 - 22 -
(2, 0) 23 17 - 23 -
(1, 0) 24 18 - 24 -
(0, 0) 25 19 - 25 -
Part 1.5
Figure 1: Calculation of GHWs and RGHWs for C1 = RM5(5, 2) and C2 =
RM5(3, 2).
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r = m dr(C1) Mm(C1, C2)
1 15 15
2 19 19
3 20 22
Table 1: C1 = RM5(2, 2), C2 = RM5(1, 2).
r = m dr(C1) Mm(C1, C2)
1 10 10
2 14 14
3 15 17
4 18 19
Table 2: C1 = RM5(3, 2), C2 = RM5(2, 2).
For the above choice of C1 and C2 most of the time the GHWs and
RGHWs are the same. This however, is not the general situation for q-ary
Reed-Muller codes as the following choices of C1 and C2 illustrate.
In the remaining part of this example we concentrate on q-ary Reed-Muller
codes C1 = RM5(u1, 2), C2 = RM5(u2, 2) where u1 = u2 + 1. In Table 1,
Table 2, Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5, respectively, we present parameters
dr(C1) and Mm(C1, C2) for (u1, u2) equal to (2, 1), (3, 2), (4, 3), (5, 4), and
(6, 5) respectively.
r = m dr(C1) Mm(C1, C2)
1 5 5
2 9 9
3 10 12
4 13 14
5 14 15
Table 3: C1 = RM5(4, 2), C2 = RM5(3, 2).
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r = m dr(C1) Mm(C1, C2)
1 4 4
2 5 7
3 8 9
4 9 10
Table 4: C1 = RM5(5, 2), C2 = RM5(4, 2).
r = m dr(C1) Mm(C1, C2)
1 3 3
2 4 5
3 5 6
Table 5: C1 = RM5(6, 2), C2 = RM5(5, 2).
5 An algorithm to compute RGHWs
By Theorem 4.8 there are still two questions that need to be addressed:
Q1 Given m ∈ {1, . . . , |Fq((a, b), s)|}, how can we find the m-th element ~a
of Fq((a, b), s) with respect to the anti lexicographic ordering?
Q2 Given ~a ∈ Fq((a, b), s) how can we find the corresponding position t
and r – with respect to the anti lexicographic ordering – in Qsq and in
Fq((0, b), s), respectively?
In this section we give answers to these two questions. We start by providing
an algorithm that solves the problem from question Q1. This algorithm is a
generalization of a method proposed in [12, Sec. 6]. Due to the nature of the
algorithm from now on we will – in contrast to the previous section – use the
full notation Fq((a, b), s), rather than just Fq((a, b)) (Definition 4.2).
Definition 5.1. Let 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ s(q − 1) and 0 ≤ v ≤ w < q be integers.
We define
Fq((a, b), (v, w), s) = {(a1, . . . , as) ∈ Fq((a, b), s) : v ≤ as ≤ w}.
We denote by ρq((a, b), s) and ρq((a, b), (v, w), s) the cardinality of Fq((a, b), s)
and Fq((a, b), (v, w), s), respectively. Most of the time the index q will be
omitted.
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1: procedure VECA(A,B, V, S,M, q: Non-negative integers with A ≤
B ≤ S(q−1), V ≤ q−1, 1 ≤ S, andM ∈ {1, . . . , |Fq((A,B), (0, V ), S)|})
2: if V > B then
3: VECA(A,B, V, S,M, q)← VECA(A,B,B, S,M, q)
4: else
5: if S 6= 1 then
6: α← max{A− V, 0}
7: r ← ρq((α,B − V ), S − 1)
8: if M > r then
9: VECA(A,B, V, S,M, q)← VECA(A,B, V − 1, S,M − r, q)
10: else if M < r then
11: VECA(A,B, V, S,M, q)←
12: (VECA(α,B − V, q − 1, S − 1,M, q), V )
13: else
14: θ1 ← α rem (q − 1)
15: θ2 ← (α− θ1)/(q − 1)
16: if θ2 < S − 1 then
17: VECA(A,B, V, S,M, q)←
18: (q − 1, . . . , q − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ2
, θ1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
S−θ2−2
, V )
19: else
20: VECA(A,B, V, S,M, q)← (q − 1, . . . , q − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ2
, V )
21: end if
22: end if
23: else
24: VECA(A,B, V, S,M, q)← (V −M + 1)
25: end if
26: end if
27: end procedure
Figure 2: The recursive algorithm VECA. We use the notation
((β1, . . . , βκ−1), βκ) = (β1, . . . , βκ−1, βκ) for concatenation.
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Theorem 5.2. Let q be a fixed prime power and consider non-negative inte-
gers a, b, v, s,m with
a ≤ b ≤ s(q − 1), v ≤ q − 1, 1 ≤ s, and m ∈ {1, . . . , |Fq((a, b), (0, v), s)|}.
If these numbers are used as input to the procedure VECA in Figure 2 then
the output is the m-th element ~a = (a1, . . . , as) of Fq((a, b), (0, v), s) with
respect to the anti lexicographic ordering.
Proof. Consider the condition
C1: A,B, V, S,M are non-negative integers with A ≤ B ≤ S(q − 1), V ≤
q − 1, 1 ≤ S and M ∈ {1, . . . , |Fq((A,B), (0, V ), S)|}.
We first show that the following loop invariant holds true:
• If V > B and A,B, V, S,M satisfy Condition C1 then the elements of
(A˜, B˜, V˜ , S˜, M˜) = (A,B,B, S,M) satisfy Condition C1.
• If V ≤ B, S 6= 1 and A,B, V, S,M satisfy Condition C1 then:
– forM > r the elements in (A˜, B˜, V˜ , S˜, M˜) = (A,B, V−1, S,M−r)
satisfy Condition C1,
– for M < r the elements in (A˜, B˜, V˜ , S˜, M˜) = (α,B− V, q− 1, S −
1,M) satisfy Condition C1. Here α = max{A− V, 0}.
Assume first V > B. We have Fq((A,B), (0, V ), S) = Fq((A,B), (0, B), S)
and the result follows. Assume next V ≤ B and S 6= 1. We consider the case
M > r (line 8–9) and leave the case M < r for the reader. By inspection
A˜ ≤ B˜ ≤ S˜(q − 1), V˜ ≤ q − 1, 1 ≤ S˜, and A˜, B˜, S˜, M˜ are non-negative.
Aiming for a contradiction we assume that V = 0 is possible (which would
cause V˜ to be negative). But then
r = ρ((α,B − V ), S − 1) = ρ((A,B), S − 1)
= ρ((A,B), (0, 0), S) = ρ((A,B), (0, V ), S) ≥M
where the inequality follows by the assumption that A,B, V, S,M satisfy
Condition C1. We have reached a contradiction. Hence, we conclude 0 < V
and therefore V˜ is non-negative. We next show that M˜ = M − r is in the
desired interval. Clearly M˜ = M − r ≥ 1. To demonstrate that M˜ ≤
|Fq((A˜, B˜), (0, V˜ ), S˜)| we note that
M ≤ ρ((A,B), (0, V ), S)
= ρ((A,B), (0, V − 1), S) + ρ((A,B), (V, V ), S)
= ρ((A,B), (0, V − 1), S) + ρ((α,B − V ), S − 1)
= ρ((A˜, B˜), (0, V˜ ), S˜) + r
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and the last part of Condition C1 is established.
Let (Ai, Bi, Si,Mi) be the value of (A,B, S,M) before entering the loop the
i-th time. The sequence
(
(A1, B1, S1,M1), (A2, B2, S2,M2), . . .
)
is strictly de-
creasing with respect to the partial ordering P, and as A,B, S,M are upper
bounded as well as lower bounded the sequence must be finite, meaning that
the algorithm terminates.
We next give an induction proof that the algorithm returns theM-th element
of Fq((A,B), (0, V ), S) with respect to the anti lexicographic ordering.
Basis step:
First assume V ≤ B, S 6= 1 and let θ1 and θ2 be as in line 14 and 15
of the algorithm. Observe that θ2 ≤ S − 1 as θ2 = S would imply V =
0 and consequently Fq((A,B), (0, V ), S) = ∅. This is not possible as by
Condition C1,M ∈ {1, . . . , |Fq((A,B), (0, V ), S)|}. Consider the last element
of Fq((α,B − V ), (V, V ), S) i.e.
(q − 1, . . . , q − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ2
, θ1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
S−θ2−2
, V )
if θ2 < S − 1, and
(q − 1, . . . , q − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ2
, V )
if θ2 = S − 1 (in which case θ1 = 0). This element is the r-th element
of Fq((A,B), (0, V ), S) where r is as in line 7. Hence, if M = r (lines 13–
22) then indeed VECA(A,B, V, S,M, q) equals the element in position M of
Fq((A,B), (0, V ), S).
Assume next V ≤ B and S = 1. We see that theM-th element of Fq((A,B), (0, V ), 1)
equals (V − (M − 1)) which corresponds to line 24.
Induction step:
If V > B then as already noted Fq((A,B), (0, V ), S) = Fq((A,B), (0, B), S).
For V ≤ B, S 6= 1 we next consider the two cases M > r and M < r
separately.
We first consider M > r corresponding to lines 8–9 of the algorithm. We
have
ρ((A,B), (V, V ), S) = ρ((α,B − V ), (0, q − 1), S − 1) = r.
But M > r and therefore the M-th element of Fq((A,B), (0, V ), S) equals
the (M − r)-th element of Fq((A,B), (0, V − 1), S).
We next consider the case M < r. Using similar arguments as above we
see that the M-th element of Fq((A,B), (0, V ), S) is in Fq((A,B), (V, V ), S).
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Therefore it equals (β1, . . . , βS−1, V ) where (β1, . . . , βS−1) is the M-th ele-
ment of Fq((α,B − V ), (0, q − 1), S − 1).
The proof is complete.
Note that for our purpose (that is, to answer Q1), the input V in the
algorithm VECA shall always be equal to q − 1. The procedure VECA
in Figure 2 uses the value ρq((A,B), S) for various choices of A,B, S. We
therefore need an algorithm to compute this number.
Lemma 5.3. Let q be a prime power and consider integers a, b, s with 0 ≤
a ≤ b ≤ s(q − 1) and s ≥ 1. We have
ρq((a, b), s) =
b∑
i=a
⌊i/q⌋∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
s
j
)(
s− 1 + i− qj
s− 1
)
.
Proof. We rewrite the first expression as follows
ρq((a, b), s) = |Fq((a, b), s)| = |Wq((a, b), s)| = |Wq((0, b), s)\Wq((0, a− 1), s)|
= |Wq(0, b), s)| − |Wq((0, a− 1), s)|
= dim(RMq(b, s))− dim(RMq(a− 1, s)).
By [22] and by Exercise 1.2.8 of [23] we have that
dim(RMq(u, s)) =
u∑
i=0
⌊i/q⌋∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
s
j
)(
s− 1 + i− qj
s− 1
)
and the proof follows.
Theorem 5.4. Let q be a prime power and consider a, b, s as in Lemma 5.3.
If the procedure RHO (see Figure 3) is used with input a, b, s, q then it returns
ρq((a, b), s).
Proof. By Lemma 5.3.
Assuming that VECA calls RHO, we can now estimate its time complex-
ity.
Lemma 5.5. The number of binary operations needed to run RHO with input
a, b, s, q is
O
(
bc
q
max{s log q, (s+ b)2 log2(s+ b)}
)
where c = b− a.
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1: procedure rho(a, b, s, q: Non-negative integers with 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ s(q −
1) and 1 ≤ s.)
2: sum← 0
3: for i := a, . . . , b do
4: for j := 0, . . . , ⌊i/q⌋ do
5: sum← sum+ (−1)j
(
s
j
)(
s−1+i−qj
s−1
)
6: end for
7: end for
8: return sum
9: end procedure
Figure 3: The algorithm RHO.
Proof. There are at most b(b − a)/q loop runs in each of which we calcu-
late two binomial coefficients, perform one multiplication and one addition.
According to [17, Example 8, p. 7] the number of binary operations needed
to calculate
(
m
n
)
is O(m2 log2 n). The highest possible m in the algorithm
is N = s + b giving at most O(N2 log2N) operations for that task. The
multiplication takes place between two numbers no larger than (s+b)! which
is O(NN ). As is well-known multiplication of positive integers A ≥ B can be
done in O(logA log logA log log logA) binary operations. In our case this be-
comes O(N log2N log logN) which is better than O(N2 log2N). Finally the
addition takes place between numbers equal to qs at most. Hence, O(s log q)
operations are needed for that part.
Proposition 3. The number of binary operations needed to perform VECA
with input a, b, v, s,M, q is
O
(
sb2 max{s log q, (s+ b)2 log2(s+ b)}
)
.
Proof. If the output of VECA is (q − g1, . . . , q − gs) then in the worst case
RHO is called g1+ · · ·+ gs times. Hence, in the worst case VECA calls RHO
sq times. In each call the first input of RHO is lower bounded by 0, the
second is upper bounded by b, and the third is upper bounded by s. The
result now follows from Lemma 5.5.
Example 6. We use the algorithm VECA in Figure 2 to find the 34-th
element ~a = (a1, . . . , a7) of F7((20, 22), 7). The procedure takes as input
(A,B, V, S,M) = (20, 22, 6, 7, 34). The notation A˜, B˜, V˜ , S˜, M˜ is as in the
proof of Theorem 5.2.
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(A,B, V, S,M) = (20, 22, 6, 7, 34):
ρ7((14, 16), 6) = 23415 > 34 (lines 10–12). Thus a7 = 6, A˜ = max{0, 20 −
6} = 14, B˜ = 22− 6 = 16, V˜ = q − 1 = 6 and S˜ = 7− 1 = 6.
(A,B, V, S,M) = (14, 16, 6, 6, 34):
ρ7((8, 10), 5) = 1936 > 34 (lines 10–12). Thus a6 = 6, A˜ = max{0, 14− 6} =
8, B˜ = 16− 6 = 10, V˜ = q − 1 = 6 and S˜ = 6− 1 = 5.
(A,B, V, S,M) = (8, 10, 6, 5, 34):
ρ7((2, 4), 4) = 64 > 34 (lines 10–12). Thus a5 = 6, A˜ = max{0, 8 − 6} = 2,
B˜ = 10− 6 = 4, V˜ = q − 1 = 6 and S˜ = 5− 1 = 4.
(A,B, V, S,M) = (2, 4, 6, 4, 34):
6 > 4 (lines 2–3). Thus V˜ = B = 4.
(A,B, V, S,M) = (2, 4, 4, 4, 34):
ρ7((0, 0), 3) = 1 < 34 (lines 8–9). Thus M˜ = 34− 1 = 33 and V˜ = 4− 1 = 3.
(A,B, V, S,M) = (2, 4, 3, 4, 33):
ρ7((0, 1), 3) = 4 < 33 (lines 8–9). Thus M˜ = 33− 4 = 29 and V˜ = 3− 1 = 2.
(A,B, V, S,M) = (2, 4, 2, 4, 29):
ρ7((0, 2), 3) = 10 < 29 (lines 8–9). Thus M˜ = 29−10 = 19 and V˜ = 2−1 = 1.
(A,B, V, S,M) = (2, 4, 1, 4, 19):
ρ7((1, 3), 3) = 19 = 19 (lines 13–17). We have θ1 = 1 and θ2 = 0, thus
(a1, a2, a3, a4) = (1, 0, 0, 1) and the algorithm ends.
In conclusion the 34-th element of F7((20, 22), 7) is (a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7) =
(1, 0, 0, 1, 6, 6, 6).
Having answered question Q1 from the beginning of the section we now
turn to question Q2. Given ~a ∈ Fq((a, b), s) we need a method to determine
what are the corresponding positions r and t in Fq((0, b), s) and Q
s
q, respec-
tively. The following proposition tells us how to find r. This is done by
applying the formula (16) in there in combination with the algorithm RHO.
Proposition 4. The element ~a = (a1, . . . , as) ∈ Fq((a, b), s) is the r-th ele-
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ment of Fq((a, b), s) with respect to the anti lexicographic ordering, where
r =
s−1∑
j=0
q−as−j−2∑
i=0
ρq((max{0, a−
j∑
t=0
as−t−i−1}, b−
j∑
t=1
as−t−i−1), s−j−1)+1.
In particular if a = 0 then
r =
s−1∑
j=0
q−as−j−2∑
i=0
ρq((0, b−
j∑
t=1
as−t − i− 1), s− j − 1) + 1. (16)
Proof. We must count the number of elements ~b = (b1, . . . , bs) in Fq((a, b), s)
which are smaller than or equal to ~a with respect to the anti lexicographic
ordering. This number equals
r = |{~b ∈ Fq((a, b), s) : ~bA~a}|
= |{~b ∈ Fq((a, b), s) : bs > as}|+ |{~b ∈ Fq((a, b), s) : ~aA~b, bs = as}|
= ρ((a, b), (as + 1, q − 1), s) + |{~b ∈ Fq((a, b), s) : bs−1 > as−1, bs = as}|
+|{~b ∈ Fq((a, b), s) : ~aA~b, bs−1 = as−1, bs = as}|
= ρ((a, b), (as + 1, q − 1), s) + ρ((max{0, a− as}, b− as), (as−1 + 1, q − 1), s− 1)
+|{~b ∈ Fq((a, b), s) : ~aA~b, bs−1 = as−1, bs = as}|
= · · ·
=
s−1∑
j=0
ρ((max{0, a−
j−1∑
t=0
as−t}, b−
j−1∑
t=0
as−t), (as−j + 1, q − 1), s− j) + |{~a}|
=
s−1∑
j=0
ρ((max{0, a−
j−1∑
t=0
as−t}, b−
j−1∑
t=0
as−t), (as−j + 1, q − 1), s− j) + 1.
By the below Lemma 5.6, for j = 0, . . . , s− 1 we have
ρ((max{0, a−
j−1∑
t=0
as−t}, b−
j−1∑
t=0
as−t), (as−j + 1, q − 1), s− j)
=
q−as−j−2∑
i=0
ρ((max{0, a−
j∑
t=0
as−t − i− 1}, b−
j∑
t=1
as−t − i− 1), s− j − 1)
and the proof is complete.
Lemma 5.6. Given a prime power q, let 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ s(q − 1) and 0 ≤ v ≤
w < min{b, q} be integers. Then ρq((a, b), (v, w), s) =
∑w−v
i=0 ρq((max{0, a −
v − i}, b− v − i), s− 1).
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Proof.
ρ((a, b), (v, w), s) = |Fq((a, b), (v, w), s)|
= |{(a1, . . . , as) ∈ Fq((a, b), s) : v ≤ as ≤ w}|
= |
w−v⋃
i=0
{(a1, . . . , as) ∈ Fq((a, b), s) : as = v + i}|
= |
w−v⋃
i=0
Fq((a, b), (v + i, v + i), s)|
=
w−v∑
i=0
ρ((a, b), (v + i, v + i), s)
=
w−v∑
i=0
ρ((max{0, a− v − i}, b− v − i), s− 1).
Setting a = 0 and b = s(q − 1) in Proposition 4 we could of course
compute the t such that ~a is the t-th element of Qsq, but with the following
reformulation of Lemma 4 we can calculate it much easier.
Lemma 5.7. The element (a1, . . . , as) ∈ Q
s
q is the t-th element of Q
s
q with
respect to the anti lexicographic ordering where
t = qs −
s∑
i=1
aiq
i−1.
Proof. Recall from Section 4 the map µ : Qsq → Q
s
q, µ(a1, . . . , as) = (q − 1−
as, . . . , q−1−a1). By Lemma 4.5 µ(a1, . . . , as) = (q−1−as, . . . , q−1−a1) is
the t element of Qsq using the lexicographic ordering where t− 1 =
∑s
i=1(q−
1 − ai)q
i−1 = qs − 1 −
∑s
i=1 aiq
i−1. Recall from Section 4 that ~c≺A~d ⇐⇒
µ(~c)≺Lexµ(~d). Therefore (a1, . . . , as) is the t-th element of Q
s
q using the anti
lexicographic ordering.
Summarizing this section: to find the m-th RGHW of C1 = RMq(u1, s)
with respect to C2 = RMq(u2, s), we perform the following steps.
1. Find the m-th element (a1, . . . , as) of Fq((u2 + 1, u1), s) by using the
algorithm VECA in Theorem 5.2 with input A = u2 + 1, B = u1,
V = q − 1, S = s, and M = m.
2. Find the r-th position of (a1, . . . , as) in Fq((0, u1), s) using Proposition 4
in combination with the algorithm RHO.
3. Find the t-th position of (a1, . . . , as) in Q
s
q using Lemma 5.7.
4. Compute Mm(C1, C2) = t− r +m (Theorem 4.8).
Example 7. This is a continuation of Example 5, in the beginning of which
we considered C1 = RM5(5, 2) and C2 = RM5(3, 2). Applying the above
procedure to establish the 8-th RGHW we first use Theorem 5.2 to establish
that the 8-th element of F5((4, 5), 2) is (3, 1). Using Proposition 4 we then
find that (3, 1) is the 11-th element of F5((0, 5), 2) and Lemma 5.7 next tells
us that it is the 17-th element of Q25. Hence, M8(C1, C2) = 17− 11+ 8 = 14.
Example 8. We consider C1 = RM16(90, 7) and C2 = RM16(88, 7). We
want to compute the 1000-th RGHW of C1 with respect to C2. Applying the
algorithm VECA in Theorem 5.2 we find that that (9, 10, 14, 11, 15, 15, 15)
is the 1000-th element of F16((88, 90), 7). Applying next Proposition 4 and
Lemma 5.7 we find that it is the 14557-th element of F16((0, 90), 7) and the
16727-th element of Q716. Hence, M1000(C1, C2) = 16727 − 14557 + 1000 =
3170. To find the 1000-th GHW of C1, we use Theorem 5.2 with C2 =
RM16(−1, 7) and we find that (5, 1, 10, 15, 15, 15, 15) is the 1000-th element
of F16((0, 90), 7). By Lemma 5.7 it is the 1515-th element of Q
7
16. Hence,
from Theorem 4.6 we deduce d1000(C1) = 1515.
6 Closed formula expressions for q-ary Reed-
Muller codes in two variables
In the previous section we presented a method to calculate RGHWs for any
set of q-ary Reed-Muller codes Ci = RMq(ui, s), i = 1, 2. As an alternative,
for q-ary Reed-Muller codes in two variables (which by Definition 3.1 means
that s = 2) it is a manageable task to list closed formula expressions for
all possible situations. This is done in the first half of the present section.
Letting next u2 = −1, corresponding to C2 = {~0}, we in particular get
closed formula expressions for the GHWs (such formulas – to the best of our
knowledge – cannot be found in the literature). The formulas in the present
section can be derived by applying Proposition 2 directly. We shall leave
the details for the reader. To simplify the description we use the notation
t = u1− u2 which of course implies that u1 = u2 + t. Hence, throughout this
section C2 = RMq(u2, 2) and C1 = RMq(u2 + t, 2).
6.1 Formulas for RGHW
We have the following three cases.
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6.1.1 First case: u2 − q + 2 ≥ 0
Y 4 XY 4 X2Y 4 X3Y 4 X4Y 4
Y 3 XY 3 X2Y 3 X3Y 3 X4Y 3
Y 2 XY 2 X2Y 2 X3Y 2 X4Y 2
Y XY X2Y X3Y X4Y
1 X X2 X3 X4
W5(5, 6) underlined, i.e. u2 = 4 and t = 2
(First case)
In this case the codimension is ℓ = t(2q − u2 − t− 2) +
t(t+1)
2
.
• If m = 1, . . . , t(2q − u2 − t− 2) then there exist a ∈ {0, . . . , 2(q − 1)−
u2 − t− 1} and b ∈ {1, . . . , t} such that m = at + b. We have
Mm(C1, C2) =
(
2q − 2− u2 −
a
2
)
(a+ 1) + b− t.
• If m = t(2q− u2− t− 2) + 1, . . . , t(2q − u2− t− 2) +
t(t+1)
2
, then there
exists c ∈
{
1, . . . , t(t+1)
2
}
such that m = t(2q−u2− t−2)+ c. We have
Mm(C1, C2) =
1
2
(2q − u2 − t− 2)(2q − u2 + t− 1) + c.
6.1.2 Second case: u2 − q + t+ 1 ≤ 0
In this case the codimension is ℓ = t(t+1)
2
+ t(u2 + 1).
• Ifm = 1, . . . , t(t+1)
2
then there exist a ∈ {0, . . . , t−1} and b ∈ {1, . . . , a+
1} such that m = a(a+1)
2
+ b. We have
Mm(C1, C2) = q(q − u2 − t+ a) + b− a− 1.
• If m = t(t+1)
2
+1, . . . , t(t+1)
2
+ t(u2 +1), then there exist a ∈ {0, . . . , u2}
and b ∈ {1, . . . , t} such that m = t(t+1)
2
+ at+ b. We have
Mm(C1, C2) = q(q + a− u2) + b− t− 1−
a(a + 3)
2
.
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Y 4 XY 4 X2Y 4 X3Y 4 X4Y 4
Y 3 XY 3 X2Y 3 X3Y 3 X4Y 3
Y 2 XY 2 X2Y 2 X3Y 2 X4Y 2
Y XY X2Y X3Y X4Y
1 X X2 X3 X4
W5(2, 3) underlined, i.e. u2 = 1 and t = 2
(Second case)
Y 4 XY 4 X2Y 4 X3Y 4 X4Y 4
Y 3 XY 3 X2Y 3 X3Y 3 X4Y 3
Y 2 XY 2 X2Y 2 X3Y 2 X4Y 2
Y XY X2Y X3Y X4Y
1 X X2 X3 X4
W5(3, 5) underlined, i.e. u2 = 2 and t = 3
(Third case)
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6.1.3 Third case: u2 − q + 2 < 0 and u2 − q + t+ 1 > 0
In this case the codimension is ℓ = (2q−u2)(u2+t)+3(q−u2)−q
2−2− t(t+3)
2
.
• If m = 1, . . . , 1
2
(q − u2 − 2)(2t − q + u2 + 1) + t then there exist a ∈
{0, . . . , q − u2 − 2} and b ∈ {1, . . . , u2 + t − q + a + 2} such that
m = a(u2 + t− q + 1) +
a(a+1)
2
+ b. We have
Mm(C1, C2) = (a + 2)(q − 1)− u2 − t + b.
• If m = 1
2
(q−u2−2)(2t−q+u2+1)+t+1, . . . ,
1
2
(q−u2−2)(2t−q+u2+
1) + t(q − t) then there exist a ∈ {0, . . . , q − t − 2} and b ∈ {1, . . . , t}
such that m = 1
2
(q − u2 − 2)(2t− q + u2 + 1) + (a+ 1)t+ b. We have
Mm(C1, C2) = q(q − u2 + a)−
a(a + 3)
2
− t + b− 1.
• If m = 1
2
(q−u2−2)(2t−q+u2+1)+ t(q− t)+1, . . . , (2q−u2)(u2+ t)+
3(q−u2)−q
2−2− t(t+3)
2
then there exists c ∈ {1, . . . , 1
2
((t+1)2−(q−u2−
1)2+q−u2−t−2)} such thatm =
1
2
(q−u2−2)(2t−q+u2+1)+t(q−t)+c.
We have
Mm(C1, C2) =
1
2
(3q2 − 2u2q − 3q − t
2 − t) + c.
6.2 Formulas for GHW
Applying the formulas from the previous section to the special case of u2 =
−1 and consequently u1 = t+1 we get by letting u = u1 the following results
concerning the GHWs of RMq(u, s).
6.2.1 The case u− q + 1 ≤ 0
In this case the dimension of C1 is k1 =
(u+1)(u+2)
2
.
• For r = 1, . . . , (u+1)(u+2)
2
there exist a ∈ {0, . . . , u} and b ∈ {1, . . . , a+1}
such that r = a(a+1)
2
+ b. We have
dr(C1) = q(q − u+ a) + b− a− 1.
30
6.2.2 The case u− q + 1 > 0
In this case the dimension of C1 is k1 = q(2u1 − q + 3)−
u1(u1+3)
2
− 1.
• For r = 1, . . . , q(u+2)− u(u+3)
2
−1 there exist a ∈ {0, . . . , 2(q−1)−u}
and b ∈ {1, . . . , u− q + 2 + a} such that r = a(u− q + 1) + a(a+1)
2
+ b.
We have
dr(C1) = (a+ 2)(q − 1)− u+ b.
• For r = q(u + 2) − u(u+3)
2
, . . . , q(2u − q + 3) − u(u+3)
2
− 1 there exists
c ∈ {1, . . . , q(u − q + 1)} such that r = q(u + 2) − u(u+3)
2
− 1 + c. We
have
dr(C1) = q(2q − u− 1) + c.
6.3 Comparing RGHW and GHW in a special case
Consider the special case u2 = q − 2 and t = 1. If m = 1, . . . , q then there
exist a ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1} and b ∈ {1, . . . , a+ 1} such that m = a(a+1)
2
+ b. We
have
Mm(C1, C2) =
m
2
(2q −m+ 1) and dm(C1) = (q − 1)(a+ 1) + b
Thus
Mm(C1, C2)− dm(C1) =
1
8
(−a4 − 2a3 + (−4b+ 4q + 1)a2
+(−4b− 4q + 10)a− 4b2 + 8bq − 4b− 8q + 8).
For the particular case that q = 16 we get the values listed in Table 6
7 Locally correctable ramp secret sharing schemes
We now return to the communication problem described in the introduction
of the paper. Recall that we consider a secret sharing scheme based on
a coset construction C1/C2 where C1 and C2 are q-ary Reed-Muller codes.
Requirement R2 about local correctability was treated in Theorem 1.3. In
Section 3 – Section 6 we showed a low complexity method to determine the
RGHWs and in particular we derived closed formula expressions in the case
of codes in two variables. By the following result (corresponding to (2) and
(3))
tm = Mm((C2)
⊥, (C1)
⊥)− 1, rm = n−Mℓ−m+1(C1, C2) + 1, (17)
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m 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
diff(m) 0 0 14 15 29 43 45 59 73 87
Mm(C1, C2) 16 31 46 61 76 91 106 121 136 151
m 11 12 13 14 15 16
diff(m) 90 104 118 132 146 150
Mm(C1, C2) 166 181 196 211 226 241
Table 6: The special case u2 = q − 2 and t = 1 with q = 16. That
is, C1 = RM16(15, 2) and C2 = RM16(14, 2). The function diff(m) equals
Mm(C1, C2)− dm(C1).
this method immediately translates into accurate information on the infor-
mation leakage and thereby explains what can be done regarding requirement
R1.
Combining (17) with (6) and (7) and using Remark 1 we obtain
t1 = d(C
⊥
2 )− 1, r1 = dim(C2) + 1,
tℓ = dim(C1)− 1, rℓ = n− d(C1) + 1,
(18)
where d(C) is the minimum distance of C. To apply Theorem 1.3 (which
ensures local correctability) we need u1 < q−1. Under that assumption (18)
becomes
t1 = u2 + 1, r1 =
(
s+u2
u2
)
+ 1,
tℓ =
(
s+u1
u1
)
− 1, rℓ = q
s − (q − u1)q
s−1 + 1 = u1q
s−1 + 1.
(19)
By Theorem 1.3 we need to make u1 + 1 or q − 1 queries (depending on the
error-probability of the system) to hopefully correct an entry. We observe
that the number of queries in both cases is strictly larger than t1. However,
it is only larger than r1 when u2 is very small. Actually, for most values
of u2 the number of queries needed will be much smaller than r1. Recall
from the proofs in [26] of the local correctability of q-ary Reed-Muller codes
that the random point sets queried is chosen from a family of point sets
with a particular geometry (the geometry is different for the three different
cases treated in Theorem 1.3). Knowing only the values t1 and r1 – with
the number of queries being a number in between – we cannot say if those
point sets get access to information or not. However, when t2 is larger than
or equal to the number of queries then for sure they get at most access to 1
q-bit of information. As is demonstrated in the following two examples this is
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m 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
tm 6 12 17 21 24 26 27
t′m 6 7 13 14 15 20 21
rm 22 24 27 31 36 42 49
r′m 28 33 34 35 41 42 49
Table 7: Scheme based on C1 = RM8(6, 2) and C2 = RM8(5, 2). For local
error-correction 7 queries are needed.
m 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
tm 5 6 11 12 16 17 20 21 23 24 25 26 27
t′m 5 6 7 12 13 14 15 19 20 21 22 23 26
rm 16 17 19 20 23 24 28 29 34 35 41 42 49
r′m 19 20 21 25 26 27 28 33 34 35 41 42 49
Table 8: Scheme based on C1 = RM8(6, 2) and C2 = RM8(4, 2). For local
error-correction 7 queries are needed.
often the case. Of course the situation gets more complicated if the decoding
is not successful in the first run and another series of queries is needed. In
that case we may either ensure that the information from the first query is
deleted or we may simply trust the party that performs the error-correction.
Below we study in detail various schemes over the alphabets F8 and F16.
Example 9. In this example we consider schemes over F8. Depending on
the error-probability it is sufficient to make u1 + 1 or q − 1 = 7 queries to
correct an entry. The number of participants is n = 82 = 64. In Table 7 –
Table 12 we consider codes C1 = RMq(u1, 2) and C2 = RMq(u2) for different
choices of u2 < u1 ≤ q − 2 and we list the parameters t = t1, . . . , tℓ and
r1, . . . , rℓ = r (in particular the number of columns equals the codimension
ℓ). We also list corresponding numbers t′1, . . . , t
′
ℓ and r1, . . . , r
′
ℓ. They are
the lower bounds and upper bounds, respectively, that we would get on the
ti’s and the ri’s, respectively, by using GHWs instead of RGHWs. It is quite
clear that the amount of information leaked to the party performing the local
error-correction is often lower than what could be anticipated from studying
only the GHWs.
Example 10. In this example we consider schemes over F16. Depending on
the error-probability it is sufficient to make u1 + 1 or q − 1 = 15 queries.
The number of participants is n = 162 = 264. The information in Table 13
– Table 18 is similar to the previous example.
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m 1 2 3 4 5 6
tm 5 10 14 17 19 20
t′m 5 6 7 12 13 14
rm 16 19 23 28 34 41
r′m 25 26 27 33 34 41
Table 9: Scheme based on C1 = RM8(5, 2) and C2 = RM8(4, 2). For local
error-correction 6 or 7 queries are needed, depending on the error-probability.
m 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
tm 4 5 9 10 13 14 16 17 18 19 20
t′m 4 5 6 7 11 12 13 14 15 18 19
rm 11 12 15 16 20 21 26 27 33 34 41
r′m 13 17 18 19 20 25 26 27 33 34 41
Table 10: Scheme based on C1 = RM8(5, 2) and C2 = RM8(3, 2). For local
error-correction 6 or 7 queries are needed, depending on the error-probability.
m 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
tm 3 4 5 8 9 10 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
t′m 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 12 13 14 15 17 18 19 20
rm 7 8 9 12 13 14 18 19 20 25 26 27 33 34 41
r′m 9 10 11 12 13 17 18 19 20 25 26 27 33 34 41
Table 11: Scheme based on C1 = RM8(5, 2) and C2 = RM8(2, 2). For local
error-correction 6 or 7 queries are needed, depending on the error-probability.
m 1 2 3 4 5
tm(RGHW ) 4 8 11 13 14
tm(GHW ) 4 5 6 7 11
rm(RGHW ) 11 15 20 26 33
rm(GHW ) 18 19 25 26 33
Table 12: Scheme based on C1 = RM8(4, 2) and C2 = RM8(3, 2). For local
error-correction 5 or 7 queries are needed, depending on the error-probability.
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m 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
tm 14 28 41 53 64 74 83 91 98 104 109 113 116 118 119
t′m 14 15 29 30 31 44 45 46 47 59 60 61 62 63 74
rm 106 108 111 115 120 126 133 141 150 160 171 183 196 210 225
r′m 161 162 163 164 165 177 178 179 180 193 194 195 209 210 225
Table 13: Scheme based on C1 = RM16(14, 2) and C2 = RM16(13, 2). For
local error-correction 15 queries are needed.
m 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
tm 13 26 38 49 59 68 76 83 89 94 98 101 103 104
t′m 13 14 15 28 29 30 31 43 44 45 46 47 58 59
rm 92 95 99 104 110 117 125 134 144 155 167 180 194 209
r′m 146 147 148 149 161 162 163 164 177 178 179 193 194 209
Table 14: Scheme based on C1 = RM16(13, 2) and C2 = RM16(12, 2). For
local error-correction 14 or 15 queries are needed, depending on the error-
probability.
m 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
tm 12 24 35 45 54 62 69 75 80 84 87 89 90
t′m 12 13 14 15 27 28 29 30 31 42 43 44 45
rm 79 83 88 94 101 109 118 128 139 151 164 178 193
r′m 131 132 133 145 146 147 148 161 162 163 177 178 193
Table 15: Scheme based on C1 = RM16(12, 2) and C2 = RM16(11, 2). For
local error-correction 13 or 15 queries are needed, depending on the error-
probability.
m 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
tm 11 22 32 41 49 56 62 67 71 74 76 77
t′m 11 12 13 14 15 26 27 28 29 30 31 41
rm 67 72 78 85 93 102 112 123 135 148 162 177
r′m 116 117 129 130 131 132 145 146 147 161 162 177
Table 16: Scheme based on C1 = RM16(11, 2) and C2 = RM16(10, 2). For
local error-correction 12 or 15 queries are needed, depending on the error-
probability.
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m 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
tm 10 20 29 37 44 50 55 59 62 64 65
t′m 10 11 12 13 14 15 25 26 27 28 29
rm 56 62 69 77 86 96 107 119 132 146 161
r′m 101 113 114 115 116 129 130 131 145 146 161
Table 17: Scheme based on C1 = RM16(10, 2) and C2 = RM16(9, 2). For
local error-correction 11 or 15 queries are needed, depending on the error-
probability.
m 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
tm 9 18 26 33 39 44 48 51 53 54
t′m 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 24 25 26
rm 46 53 61 70 80 91 103 116 130 145
r′m 97 98 99 100 113 114 115 129 130 145
Table 18: Scheme based on C1 = RM16(9, 2) and C2 = RM16(8, 2). For
local error-correction 10 or 15 queries are needed, depending on the error-
probability.
8 Concluding remarks
In this paper we applied a coset construction of q-ary Reed-Muller codes to
the situation where a central party wants to store a secret on a distributed
media in such a way that other parties with access to a large part of the me-
dia can recover the secret, whereas parties with limited access cannot. The
reason for choosing q-ary Reed-Muller codes is that with such codes one is
able to perform local error-correction. For the purpose of analysing the infor-
mation leakage we determined the relative generalized Hamming weights of
the codes involved. This was done using the footprint bound from Gröbner
basis theory. There is a very strong connection between the footprint bound
and the Feng-Rao bound for primary codes [1, 10] which is the bound that
we used in [9] to estimate RGHWs of one-point algebraic geometric codes.
Using the footprint bound rather than the Feng-Rao bound for primary or
dual codes saved us some cumbersome notation (which is difficult to avoid in
the case of one-point algebraic geometric codes). Using the derived informa-
tion on the RGHWs we discussed the trade off between security in the above
scheme and the ability to perform local error-correction.
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A Proof of Lemma 4.7
To prove Lemma 4.7 we start by generalizing [11, Th. 3.7.7] which corre-
sponds to Lemma A.1 below in the particular case that b = s(q − 1). The
proof of [11, Th. 3.7.7] was given in [11, App. B.1].
Lemma A.1. Let A be a subset of Fq(a, b) consisting of m elements. Then
|∆L(a,b)(m)| ≤ |∆A|.
Proof. In Appendix B.1 of [11] a proof for Lemma A.1 is given in the par-
ticular case that b = s(q − 1). We indicate how this proof can be modified
to cover all possible choices of b. First note that [11] uses v where we use
a, uses m where we use s, and uses r where we use m. With the following
modifications the proof in [11] is lifted to a proof of Lemma A.1.
• In [11, Rem. B.1.2]: Replace F≥v with Fq(v, b) and let the parameter k
go from v to b.
• In [11, Def. B.1.6]: Replace F≥l with Fq(l, b).
• In [11, Lem. B.1.10]: Replace F≥v with Fq(v, b) and let the summation
end with Ab rather than As(q−1).
• In [11, Lem. B.1.13, Lem. B.1.14 and their proofs]: Replace F≥l, F≥(l−1),
F≥v, L≥l−1(r) and L≥l(r) with Fq(l, b), Fq(l−1, b), Fq(v, b), L(l,b)(r) and
L(l−1,b)(r), respectively.
Recall from Section 4 the map µ : Qsq → Q
s
q given by µ(a1, . . . , as) =
(q−1−as, . . . , q−1−a1). To translate Lemma A.1 into Lemma 4.7 we need
the following results.
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Lemma A.2. Let 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ s(q − 1) be integers, ~a,~b ∈ Qsq and m ∈
{1, . . . , |Fq(a, b)|}, then we have that
1. ~a≺Lex~b ⇐⇒ µ(~a)≺Aµ(~b),
2. ~a≺A~b ⇐⇒ µ(~a)≺Lexµ(~b),
3. ~aP~b ⇐⇒ µ(~a)Pµ(~b),
4. µ(∇~a) = ∆µ(~a),
5. µ(∇A) = ∆µ(A),
6. µ(Fq(a, b)) = Fq(s(q − 1)− b, s(q − 1)− a),
7. A ⊆ Fq(a, b) ⇐⇒ µ(A) ⊆ Fq(s(q − 1)− b, s(q − 1)− a),
8. µ(N(a,b)(m)) = L(s(q−1)−b,s(q−1)−a)(m),
9. µ(∇N(a,b)(m)) = ∆L(s(q−1)−b,s(q−1)−a)(m).
Proof. Let ~a = (a1, . . . , as) and ~b = (b1, . . . , bs).
1. ~a≺Lex~b ⇐⇒ a1 = b1, . . . , al−1 = bl−1, al < bl for some l ⇐⇒ q −
1 − a1 = q − 1 − b1, . . . , q − 1 − al−1 = q − 1 − bl−1, q − 1 − al >
q − 1− bl for some l ⇐⇒ µ(~a)≺Aµ(~b).
2. Similar to 1.
3. ~aP~b ⇐⇒ a1 ≤ b1, . . . , as ≤ bs ⇐⇒ q − 1− a1 ≥ q − 1− b1, . . . , q −
1− as ≥ q − 1− bs ⇐⇒ µ(~a)Pµ(~b).
4. ~b ∈ µ(∇~a) ⇐⇒ ∃~b1 = µ
−1(b) ∈ ∇~a ⇐⇒ ~b1P~a ⇐⇒ µ(~b1)Pµ(~a) ⇐⇒
~bPµ(~a) ⇐⇒ ~b ∈ ∆µ(~a).
5. µ(∇A) = µ(
⋃
~a∈A∇~a) =
⋃
~a∈A µ(∇~a) =
⋃
~a∈A∆µ(~a) = ∆
⋃
~a∈A µ(~a) =
∆µ(A).
6. ~a ∈ Fq(a, b) ⇐⇒ a ≤ deg(~a) ≤ b ⇐⇒ a ≤
∑s
i=1 ai ≤ b ⇐⇒
s(q − 1)− a ≥ s(q − 1)−
∑s
i=1 ai ≥ s(q − 1)− b ⇐⇒ s(q − 1)− b ≤∑s
i=1(q−1−ai) ≤ s(q−1)−a ⇐⇒ µ(~a) ∈ Fq(s(q−1)−b, s(q−1)−a).
7. Similar to 6.
8. Follows from 1,2 and 7 by induction.
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9. µ(∇N(a,b)(m)) = ∆µ(N(a,b)(m)) = ∆L(s(q−1)−b,s(q−1)−a)(m).
We are now ready to prove Lemma 4.7.
Proof of Lemma 4.7. By 7. in Lemma A.2 we have µ(A) ⊆ Fq(s(q − 1) −
b, s(q − 1)− a). It follows that
|∇N(a,b)(m)| = |µ(∇N(a,b)(m))|
= |∆L(s(q−1)−b,s(q−1)−a)(m)|
≤ |∆µ(A)|
= |µ(∇A)|
= |∇A|,
where the first and the last line is a consequence of the fact that µ is bijective,
the second line follows from 9. in Lemma A.2, the third line follows from
Lemma A.1, and the fourth line follows from 5. in Lemma A.2.
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